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THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD UNIT MOBILIZATION PROCESS: TRANSFORMING TO MEET THE NEEDS OF THE FUTURE FORCE
We are in the beginning of a long, difficult war, the like of which this nation has never fought before. Since September 12, 2001 , daily more than 100,000 Army National Guard Citizen Soldiers have been mobilized. We don't see any end in sight. 1 " -LT. General H. Steven Blum, Chief National Guard Bureau
The nation's mobilization process included a National Guard role from the very beginning of the Guard's history. The historical role and mission of the Army National Guard (ARNG) were established on December 13, 1636 , when the General Court of Massachusetts Bay Colony ordered the organization of the Colony's militia companies into three regiments. The Militia Act of 1792 established a "Uniform Militia throughout the United States" of able-bodied citizens, age . These earliest citizen-soldiers were required to enroll and mobilize themselves with the appropriate weaponry. 2 The ARNG is a community-based force, operating out of approximately 3200 armories located in nearly 2700 communities across the states and territories. Guard members often live in the community where they train. The bond to the community is part of the legacy of the citizen-soldier.
The ARNG is one of three components of the U.S. Total Army, which consists of Active, Guard, and Reserve components. The ARNG is composed of reservists, civilians who serve their country on a part-time basis. Each state and territory has its own ARNG as provided by the United States Constitution.
Both the states and the federal government control the ARNG, depending on the circumstance. However, the Active Army and Army Reserve (USAR) are completely controlled by the Federal Government, and Army Reserve soldiers serve solely as a federal reserve to the Active Army. On the other hand, the ARNG has unique missions, with both state and federal responsibilities.
During peacetime the governor, through the State Adjutant General, a Major General appointed by the governor, commands ARNG forces. The Governor can mobilize the Guard for local and statewide emergencies, such as storms, drought, civil disturbances, floods, hurricanes, to name a few. In addition, the President of the United States can activate and mobilize the National Guard to participate in Federal missions. When federalized, ARNG units are commanded by the Combatant Commander of the theater in which they are operating.
As our nation adjusts to the post September 11 th world, American military forces are in the midst of a significant transformation, which involves the structure, equipment, doctrine, and the mobilization process. The ARNG, under-funded for decades, now is a centerpiece in the nation's biggest, longest mobilization since World War II. This study reviews the role of the ARNG and the unit mobilization process. It describes the current unit mobilization process and proposes adoption of a future process referred to as Direct Deployment. Our current process of alert, mobilize, train and deploy-given current time constraints, resources, and the unit mobilization process-is outdated. It is time to transform the unit mobilization process.
UNIT MOBILIZATION PROCESS

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE MOBILIZATION PROCESS
From a national strategic perspective, a responsive mobilization capability fundamentally contributes to our national security, as indicated in the President's National Security Strategy and its derivative military strategy. The national process of graduated response (GR) provides the framework for achieving the desired mobilization capability; it provides a model for coordinating resources and plans for military and national mobilization. It triggers five levels of response options that can be adjusted according to the degree of severity and ambiguity of warning indicators or events. These options allow the government to take small or large, often reversible, steps to increase our national security emergency preparedness posture. 6 GR actions enhance deterrence, mitigate the impact of an untoward event or crisis, and significantly reduce the lead time associated with a mobilization if the crisis intensifies. GR is the process by which the United States responds to early ambiguous or explicit warnings of an emerging national security emergency. It includes preplanned measures in the areas of force readiness and operations. Mobilization is a function of the joint command and control process.
Consistent with the Department of Defense Total Force Policy, GR provides our current procedures for joint military mobilization planning and execution. 7 Figure 1 depicts the GR process for achieving the desired Military and National Mobilization.
But is this process of GR adequately supporting the current national strategy? GR assumes a gradual increase in threat. But GR does not provide adequate response to preemptive strike and does not support a quick preemptive war. If preemptive war or preemptive strikes are our future then GR makes little sense. The Guard must provide the kind of forces that America needs, when America needs them. One of Secretary Rumsfeld's key mandates to the Services is to find ways to make the National Guard more ready and accessible in its federal warfighting role. In response to this mandate, the Army and Joint Forces Command are now working to dramatically improve the current mobilization process.
WHY THE U.S. ARMY SHOULD CHANGE THE CURRENT PROCESS
The ARNG must provide the kind of forces that America needs, when America needs them. One of Secretary Rumsfeld's key mandates to the Services is to find ways to make the National Guard more ready and accessible in its federal warfighting role. Working in conjunction with the other Army Components and Joint Forces Command, ARNG seeks to dramatically improve the current mobilization and demobilization process. Under current guidelines, it can take several weeks to months to prepare an ARNG unit to mobilize and deploy, compared to the Air Guard model that enables units to deploy in a matter of hours or days. The ARNG must study and adapt the Air Guard model where possible. The military strategy depends in large part on the ability of the United States to generate forces. For the US Army, mobilization is the process by which it provides the supported combatant commander with three basic components required for mission accomplishment:
forces (units), manpower (individuals), and logistics. A phased process, mobilization is designed to be concurrent and continuous, rather than sequential. It is designed to rapidly expand and enhance the Army's response to a military operation or response to a crisis or natural disaster.
14 Although mobilization involves both the active and reserve component structure, it mostly impacts the Army Reserve structure. During active mobilization, the National Command Authority has the option to exercise, with concurrence of the U.S. Congress, one or more of the five authorized levels of mobilization.
As they plan, commanders should be aware that a lower level of mobilization does not necessarily precede a higher level of mobilization. The current levels of mobilization are This five-phase mobilization process seems to offer a simple approach to mobilization. In fact, the process is challenging through all of the phases. The JFHQ-State is usually notified prior to the unit receiving its alert order, triggering the process of evaluating the unit's readiness.
The J3 Mobilization Section then starts to coordinate with the JFHQ -State staff to ensure the unit's personnel and equipment meets the required readiness objectives. Then the J3 will coordinate with the JFHQ staff for actions necessary to ensure the unit receives the required preparation, which includes: Soldier Readiness Processing; OCIE and personal clothing inspection and issue; equipment inspection; equipment maintenance; equipment shortages or substitutions', requests for equipment to National Guard Bureau (NGB); personnel transfers; budget estimate for home station training (includes lodging and meals); and transportation to the mobilization station. This process is completed by National Guard unit members, usually with support from the JFHQ -State and the States Medical Detachments, whose soldiers have the skills required for the readiness processes. The process begins when the unit has been alerted and must be completed before the unit's reporting date at the Mobilization Station. After the completion of Phase III, the JFHQ -State usually sends an assistance team to the mobilization station with the advance party to help with the transportation of the advance party soldiers around the installation, which then coordinates the arrival of the unit's equipment and personnel.
The JFHQ -State Assistance Team will usually stay through the SRP process. The process requires much coordination. Figure 2 illustrates the current process.
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HISTORY OF THE PROCESS
The modern process of preparing armies for war originated in the middle of the nineteenth century, when recruitment of volunteers to fill the ranks no longer sufficed. Governments turned to conscription, created huge forces, and harnessed their national economies to conduct war. The word "mobilization" was first used in the 1850s to describe the preparation of the Prussian Army for deployment. The American Civil War marked the appearance in the United
States of the draft and mass armies, along with the development and organization of productive resources to sustain them. The volunteer tradition of the minutemen was on its way to becoming little more than a sacred memory, and the logistical simplicity of the American Revolution was gradually falling by the wayside. The era of mobilization, the reallocation of a nation's resources for the assembly, preparation, and equipping of forces for war had arrived.
19
The very size of the forces assembled during the Civil War, when millions of men bore arms, signaled the start of a new era. Moreover, both sides successfully asserted the principle of a national military obligation, and the Confederacy sought to organize its economy to prosecute the war. In the years that followed as the United States became an industrial power with interests beyond its borders, this growing stature and the nation's wartime experience in From the 1960s until the present, the priority placed on mobilization planning depended on the resources available to our military. The US Army, using lessons learned from studies and exercises, worked to increase the ability of the US to mobilize its resources and to enhance its capability to respond with military measures to wide-ranging geographical contingencies.
RECENT CHANGES AND CURRENT ISSUES
The five-phase unit mobilization system has remained essentially the same during the past few years. The process developed during WWII has changed very little, other than adding automation and changes in Power Projection (PPP) and Support Projection Platforms (SPP).
Power Projection Platforms are designed to facilitate mobilization, deployment, redeployment, and demobilization of Active Army and Reserve Component organizations.
Transformation is changing the entire force, and the ARNG will transform to support the new structure. "The Army's modular brigade force structure will result in no difference in structure between active components and ARNG counterparts" according to National Guard 
ANALYSIS
THE ARMY OBJECTIVES OF THE MOBILIZATION PROCESS
The Army objectives in the mobilization process are identified in the four mobilization tenets that collectively identify the characteristics of successful mobilizations. These four tenets should provide the foundations for mobilization doctrine: objective, unity of effort, flexibility, and timeliness.
The first tenet requires clearly defined attainable and decisive objectives that are imperative to joint operations. Commanders and operational and mobilization planners must coordinate their efforts to ensure that the time necessary for mobilization actions is clearly understood and that resulting impacts must be clearly identified. Unity of effort assures the integrated efforts of the nation's military and supporting resource areas toward achievement of common objectives established by the President. Flexibility is necessary to develop an appropriate response to a crisis, to overcome unforeseen problems, to adapt to uncertainties, and to adjust to the fog of war. Timeliness is essential to achieving overwhelming force on the battlefield at the right time and place; it requires the coordination of resources, personnel, and information in order to react faster than the enemy.
THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD OBJECTIVES OF THE MOBILIZATION PROCESS
The ARNG objectives to mobilization are to activate the right reservists and to deliver them to the right place, at the right time, with the right equipment, for the right mission to support a combatant commander -and then to return them home again as soon as it is judiciously possible. 30 Another objective is to have predicable operating cycles and advance notification to provide units with time to prepare for mobilizations.
Time constraints.
The ARNG plays a crucial role in providing security to the nation and its citizens and to protect the interests of the country overseas. They fulfill their role in the National Military Strategy by supporting combatant commanders and conducting exercises around the world. In the future, ARNG formations will be structured and resourced to support any aspect of the 1-4-2-1 strategy. Units must be ready to load 5-30 days after the Alert. 31 Mobilization Plans allowed the ARNG sufficient time to mobilize prior to the September 11 th attack. But after that attack the nation realized that it was vulnerable within its own borders and must be organized, trained, equipped, and resourced to mobilize more rapidly to meet Army requirements. We need to be prepared to respond to national emergencies with less preparation time. Given the event of
September 11 th we may no longer have the luxury to take 30 -90 days to train and prepare at a 
Process Management
Soldier readiness is a peacetime responsibility; health care for soldiers with emphasis on dental and medical readiness, is a priority for readiness. Health Care must be integrated into Initial Entry Training (IET), One Station Unit Training (OSUT). Eliminate redundancies in the unit by conducting one Soldier Ready Processing operation, one equipment showdown prior to mobilization.
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The objective is to reduce the duplication of effort by preparing the organizations for mobilization and enabling the organization and the soldiers to be prepared through a review and, if required, preparation of their legal, medical, dental and personnel records. If the Army provides medical and dental care for the ARNG organizations to insure the soldiers are ready for deployment, the Army will benefit with higher readiness and retention rates.
OPPORTUNITIES FOR IMPROVEMENT WITH THE CURRENT MOBILIZATION PROCESS
Some of the significant mobilization processes that need improvement, as identified in the Mobilization Reform study, are automation systems; employer support; family readiness; pay and compensation; readiness; and policy, legal, doctrinal, and plans directives and documents. Every state and territory must place additional emphasis on the soldier readiness process.
Medical, dental, personnel, and pay records must be checked and corrected before deployment. Equipment and personnel must be cross leveled.
Resources
Funding Priorities: The Army's unit funding priorities prior to mobilization did not match the units selected for deployment. Units selected for mobilization received less funding than those not mobilized.
Equipment: Lack of modernized equipment in selected units caused NGB to transfer equipment nationwide, requiring additional funds and training time. NGB expended funds and manpower to move equipment from state to state to improve the readiness of deploying units. 36 This resulted in a need for more manpower at the units, and a corresponding need for warehouses and maintenance facilities to prepare, ship, and receive equipment prior to mobilization. When the equipment reaches the organization, soldiers then need new equipment training, which delayed the deployments. Mobilization Stations should receive additional funding for the preparation and execution of the mobilization process. If the states are given responsibility for conducting pre-deployment training and SRP's, a review of funding will determine whether additional funding should be provided to the states and territories.
Process Management
The Phase V, Port of embarkation begins with arrival of the unit at its POE. Actions at the SPOE or APOE include preparing and loading equipment, as well as manifesting and loading personnel. The POE phase ends with departure of personnel and equipment from the POE.
CONCLUSION
The Direct Unit Deployment process will expedite the mobilization of ARNG units and their deployment into theaters of operation, while allowing soldiers to have more time available with families and employers. The Direct Deployment process is currently used by the Air National Guard (ANG). The process will work for the ANG and is currently recommended for smaller, CS/CSS P2 organizations in the ARNG. This process eliminates current duplication in the mobilization process, but does require additional staffing from the JFHQ-State. The Direct Deployment process will free up space, resources, and manpower at the mobilization stations.
Improved efficiencies in mobilization enable the Army to maximize the operational capability of the force. The projection of unit mobilizations will allow the states to be better prepared for natural disasters and homeland security by enhancing predictability of troop strength available in their state or surrounding states. This process will allow FORSCOM to realize cost savings at the mobilization stations, and alleviate time constraints. State-owned training sites are more available because of the increased deployments. The Army could better utilize these sites to reduce the number of soldiers at the mobilization stations. The additional mobilization funding could be utilized prior to mobilization to prepare the organizations before alerts. The additional manning the PPP/SPP utilize for mobilization should be reviewed to determine if reductions are necessary. The PPP/SPP's will be used for the AC units, but not necessarily for the ARNG.
Direct deployments of ARNG units to the AOR save resources. The costs are reduced through transporting equipment directly from the LTA to the port instead of to the mobilization station and then to the port. Manpower is reduced by the elimination of redundancies. Vehicles are inspected at the Local Training Area (LTA) and verified, all personal clothing and OCIE is inspected at the LTA, and only one SRP conducted. Efficiencies can be gained by providing resources to the projected forces prior to the deployments. The JFHQ-State and the organization will then be able to focus on their mission; they will have the resources and training they require prior to mobilization. 
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